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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the discursive structures adopted by the Iranian state in the context 
of public execution. Specifically, we argue that the state’s insistence upon executing an 
offender in public is nourished by an intangible yet efficacious violence that has politically 
and psychically determinative consequences. As such, what is foregrounded in this paper are 
not the legal aspects of executing the offender and the act itself, but the visibility of this act 
and its after-effects in terms of the formation of particular subjectivity. The paper’s analysis 
draws on examinations of the psycho-discursive structure of the punitive state from the points 
of views of thinkers such as Foucault, Butler and Lacan.  
Keywords: public execution, Iran, violence, subjectivity, Lacan  
Introduction  
Whistling, crying, sighing, shouting vulgarities and whispering in sorrow, a crowd of 
witnesses – delighted, disgusted, angry, and awe-struck – is watching a condemned man 
being pulled off a stool to be hanged from a crane or scaffold. Strangled by a plastic rope, he 
takes 10-20 minutes to die in front of the watching gathering. This is the story of those 
condemned offenders who, having committed crimes such as drug trafficking, armed robbery, 
child molestation, sodomy, rape, kidnapping, terrorism and treason, are punished by the death 
penalty in Iran –  a country in which (Shia) religious principles are interwoven with the 
judiciary. In this paper, we will discuss how the concomitant function of theatricality in 
capital punishment, coupled with the underlying religious ideologies of the state, embodies 
deep-rooted cultural values and harbours potent political consequences.  
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     Here, as the opening paragraph shows, we have intentionally foregrounded the seemingly 
contradictory reactions that witnessing public executions induce. We believe that it is 
precisely the existence of such varied reactions that renders the public scene of capital 
punishment a unique locus for the functioning of ideological apparatus. In fact, this issue is 
intricately tied to the questions of “identification” and “fantasy” that, in political critique in 
general and its Lacanian version in particular, have been extensively discussed (Glynos and 
Stavrakakis, 2008). In this regard, as Adler (2015) observes, such witnesses, whether directly 
(via viewing such scenes) or indirectly (via watching their visual representations or merely 
imagining them), “experience conflicting, simultaneous, and disavowed reactions: not only 
shame and disgust but also hidden pleasure, desire, complicity, guilt, and ultimately denial” 
(p. 237). In fact, it is the existence of this fantasmatic assemblage, or, in Walter Benjamin’s 
(1999 [1936]) term, the “phantasmagoria” of different and contrasting experiences felt by 
such witnesses, that paves the way for the formation of an identificatory relation with such 
scenes. Fantasy and not “a fantasy”, as Judith Butler (1990) argues, functions “as the scene of 
the subject’s fragmentation and dissimulation” through the enactment of “a multiplication or 
proliferation of identifications that puts the very locatability of identity into question” (p. 
110).    
     In line with the above argument, Lesser (1993), in an insightful observation, remarks that 
it is more authentic to talk about people’s “interest” than their fascination or obsession with 
watching violent scenes in general and scenes of public execution in particular. As he points 
out, the word “interest” in such a context signals “our involvement in the subject”, hence an 
identificatory relation with actors as different as the hangman (i.e. the state), the offender, and 
other witnesses (p. 3). In this regard, when, in one way or another, we think “about execution 
and its real or potential witnesses [spectators]”, doing so “can help us to understand why and 
how we identify with various participants involved in the process of public execution” (p. 8). 
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Moreover, thinking about why people might be interested in watching such scenes “offers us 
new realizations about the link between pleasure and horror” (p. 8). This last point can be 
linked to the ideological purposes of a state which practises such acts in public. As will be 
shown later, Lacan’s concept of jouissance helps us further understand how an act of public 
execution is intricately linked to the ideological structure of the state.  
     Although the description of such a scene, as depicted in our opening paragraph, inevitably 
conjures up the problematic phenomenon of capital punishment in general and its public 
enactment in Iran in particular, we do not aim in this paper to consider the legal aspect of this 
issue. In other words, this study is not concerned with the (im)plausibility, (il)legitimacy and 
(ir)rationality of public execution. Nor is it concerned with the historical background of this 
issue within the context of Iran. Rather, this paper sets out to examine the less tangible – yet, 
we believe, more important – issue of witnessing the practice, which can also be generalised 
to incorporate other situations in which the issue of what it is to watch scenes of violence is 
engaged. More specifically, this paper will look closely at the political/ideological function of 
exhibiting the inherent brutality of executing an offender in public. With such an aim in 
mind, we discuss this issue, i.e. the political function of public execution
1
, within a broader 
framework or from a more comprehensive conceptual perspective. Accordingly, we aim, 
firstly, to develop our argument through an engagement with a specific conceptualisation of 
the notion of “violence”. More particularly, we seek to discern how such an approach to the 
question of violence might help us uncover the inherently determinative yet less studied 
phenomenon of watching a violent scene. This approach can help us look closely, albeit from 
a less orthodox perspective, at the effect of the punitive culture of the state and its 
representational apparatus on the formation of a particular kind of subjectivity. 
                                                          
1
 These ideas are not limited to the Iranian context; for instance, Gattrell (1994) provides an insightful analysis 
of the interrelationship of politics and public executions in England.  
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     There are two issues that are highly important in our discussion of the political function 
inherent in the state’s emphasis on the visibility of the act of public execution. Firstly, to 
consider its political function, we consider how and to what extent this act can play a role in 
(trans)forming the cultural domain so as to be able to take on a determinative ideological 
apparatus. To do so, in the first part of our analysis, we look closely at the way in which a 
society’s culture affects and is affected by the punitive mechanism of the state. This, 
ultimately, has political consequences that can lead to a particular form of subjection. 
Secondly, our argument is not founded on an understanding that simply and naïvely treats the 
witness of public execution as a subject (subjectified) and the offender as an object 
(objectified). In fact, as will be discussed later, for the state’s ideology to function efficiently, 
this binary opposition must be blurred. Indeed, in one sense, we would argue that the blurring 
of the boundary between the subject and the object of capital punishment is the very strategy 
through which the state’s ideology is established. Accordingly, in this study, these two issues 
will be studied closely. While the former issue is mainly discussed from a cultural/political 
perspective, the latter will be explored through a psychoanalytically informed lens. However, 
there are certain moments where these two approaches are employed simultaneously within 
one section or the other. This can be related to the fact that psychoanalysis and cultural 
studies have close connections (Frie, 2014; Layton, 2007, Yates, 2015).          
“Looking awry” at violence 
An investigation of the issue of witnessed public executions, rather than the issue of 
execution itself, is coterminous with a Žižekian (2008) approach to the question of violence. 
While the issue of capital punishment can be considered, in Žižek’s terms, as a form of 
“subjective violence” in which a known agent can be identified as the performer of a violent 
act, we deliberately confront the “objective” or “systematic” dimension of violence; that is, 
that kind of violence which cannot be attributed to a specific individual and, more 
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importantly, is not readily recognisable due to its non-immediately observable consequences 
(p. 1). As Žižek argues, there is always the possibility of “mystifying” the question of 
violence when one directly confronts it (p. 3). We believe that looking at the less obvious 
aspect of public execution, that is witnessing it, can help us better see how the mere act of 
watching a violent scene acts as a means within any legal system, and results in more 
gripping yet less tangible ends. 
     To see how the objective aspect of public execution acts as an ideologically controlling 
apparatus, it might be helpful to look at the very act of capital punishment itself in the first 
place. The death penalty, as Boulanger and Sarat (2005) point out, is an “intrinsic part of 
modern politics” which entails a particular ritualisation and symbolisation of the punishment 
process (p. 16). This is apparently contrary to what Foucault (1995) refers to as the 
“disappearance of spectacle” within modern political systems. In fact, while we assert the 
plausibility of such a well-documented observation, we at the same time argue that the 
deliberate manifestation of the spectacle can pursue ideologically manipulative purposes that 
would not be achieved otherwise. In spite of the significant role that the process of the death 
penalty plays in explaining the cultural life of a society, as Boulanger and Sarat observe, most 
researchers in the field concentrate “on the instrumental, political aspects of this symbolism, 
and neglect the question why it finds an audience in the first place” (p. 16).  
 A psychosocial approach to the question of violence 
In this study, Scanlon and Adlam’s (2013) psychosocial model of “reflexive violence” 
underpins our general orientation to the issue of witnessed executions. Reflexive violence has 
been defined as “the sense of a violent and impulsive action that is unconsciously and 
reflexively turned back on the embodied self” (p. 224). Our hypothesis is that the act of 
watching public execution involves a kind of “self-harm”. The notion of self-harm, as a 
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realisation of reflexive violence, is discussed by these scholars within a philosophical, 
historical and sociological framework. The authors delineate how and why, in certain 
political regimes, self-harm enacted by the supposedly mentally-disordered subject is treated 
as a deliberate action, while, in reality, “self-harm is rooted in societal violence that denies a 
voice to the oppressed, the dispossessed, the disenfranchised and the dismembered” (p. 233). 
Reflexive violence in some cases is expressed overtly in the form of, for example, self-
cutting, self-burning, self-poisoning and etc., and in other cases is manifested less obviously 
in acts such as “self-neglect, self-sabotage and extremes of stubbornness and procrastination” 
(p. 224). 
     The act of denial referred to above by the system responsible for the consideration of the 
subjects of self-harm is itself another systematic violence which is justified “by attributing to 
them [watchers] a rational intent” (p. 233). Attributing this intent to such individuals for acts 
of what appear to be self-harm is used as a shield behind which the less obvious, yet more 
consequential, issue of the “social unconscious” is disguised (Hopper, 2003; see also Brown, 
2001 and Dalal, 2011). In other words, the fact that the state does not consider the act of 
witnessing the death to be non-violent, but rather conceives of it as a moralising means – as it 
is assumed to have a deterrent effect – lays bare an important point. In a nutshell, it indicates 
that the state believes that the society’s collective unconscious is configured in a way that it 
needs to be frequently exposed to watching state-sponsored violent scenes in order not to 
commit crimes.   
     As far as the issue of attributing the intent to witnesses of public execution is concerned, 
categorising such an action in which the individual him/herself seems to be responsible for 
what s/he does as a rational behaviour, can lead to “the regressive and foreclosing use of 
identity categories” considered “as normative unconscious processes” (Layton, 2006, p. 239; 
see also Layton 2002, 2004). According to Layton, normative unconscious processes are “the 
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psychological consequences of living in a culture in which many norms serve the dominant 
ideological purpose of maintaining a power status quo” (pp. 239-40). From this perspective, 
one can argue that the exhibition of violence for such a political system turns out to act as a 
strategy or tool by which the status quo will be maintained.  
A note on self-harm 
According to Scanlon and Adlam (2013), self-harm is originally rooted “in the processes of 
traumatisation in the individual’s internalised experience of his own excluded interpersonal, 
familial, social, ethnic or historical past” (p. 225). From this perspective, the individual who, 
in one way or another, performs a harmful behaviour which has a direct or indirect effect on 
him/her uses the violent act as a defence mechanism through which s/he is able to cope with 
the traumatic experience. On the other hand, this is done unconsciously so that the afflicted 
subject does not find solace by projecting the traumatic experience onto “traumatising others, 
or the organisational and social bodies that represent them” (p. 225).  
     In a similar vein, albeit from a different perspective, Žižek (2008) asserts that watching a 
violent scene is the realisation of what he called “fetishist disavowal: ‘I know, but I don’t 
want to know that I know, so I don’t know’” (pp. 45-6). In this way, the subject intentionally 
repudiates the brutality of his/her act, in spite of the fact that s/he knows how inhumane 
his/her behaviour is. This denial, according to Žižek, is made by the subject because, as far as 
s/he pretends not to know what s/he is doing, s/he would not be assumed to be responsible for 
what is going on in front of his/her eyes.  Employing these two views in relation to the issue 
of watching public execution, one can realise that they are not only non-contradictory, but 
rather meaningfully complement one another. From the former perspective, the witness of 
public execution resists projecting his/her own traumatic experience onto any representative 
of the traumatising other, hence accepting the past traumatic reality. From the latter 
perspective, s/he strives ineffectually to forget the very traumatic experience that induces 
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him/her to attend such a violent ceremony. In fact, as far as the issue of witnessing capital 
punishment as a realisation of self-harm is concerned, it is the very complex, obscure and 
entangled juxtaposition of resistance to projecting one’s traumatic experience onto others and 
the incessant yet abortive attempt to forget that traumatic experience that renders this 
phenomenon a powerful ideological apparatus. Here, the state makes the witness of public 
execution stand on the verge of this conflicting state, hence blurring the boundary between 
the witness and the act witnessed. Confounded by what the witness experiences while 
watching the scene, s/he is prepared to receive a much more explicit message that the state 
proposes to them at the scene of public execution. In other words, what is the source of 
uncertainty and confusion for the witness turns out to become a smooth terrain for the state 
on which it finds the potential to disseminate and develop its ideology of control and 
hegemony. We turn now to a discussion of why and under what conditions Iranian society 
has been facing such a conundrum. 
Iran: a post-traumatic society? 
“Post-conflict”, “post-violent” (Brewer, 2010) or “post-traumatic” society (Alexander et. al, 
2004) is characterised by four traits. As Sztompka (2004) observes, when a society faces such 
a change which is “sudden” (in terms of “speed”), “comprehensive” (in terms of “scope”), 
“fundamental” (in terms of “content”), and “unexpected” (in terms of “mental frame”), one 
can say that this society is facing a “traumatogenic social change” (p. 159). The formation of 
unconscious processes as a consequence of encountering traumatogenic social change, as 
Hollander (2016) points out, can lead to the formation of hegemonic ideology, a particular 
collective identity, and a vertical power structure. This issue turns out to become highly 
important when, as a result of such social change, a particular psychosocial mechanism 
becomes active which leads to the constitution of a particular subjectivity (Hollander, 2013). 
In considering the above discussion, it would not be inappropriate to call Iranian society a 
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good example of a post-traumatic society. The combined experience of an eight-year long 
war (1980-1988), preceded by a deeply transformative revolution (1979) and followed by all-
encompassing sanctions mainly imposed by Western powers, particularly the U.S, has formed 
in this society a deep-seated subjectivity in which the existence of a threatening “other” is in 
one way or another always looming. Revolution, as Sztompka (2004) argues, is a prime 
example of traumatogenic social change which “embraces not only the political domain, but 
also law, economy, morality, culture, art, sometimes even language” (p. 159). While a 
political revolution is sufficient for a society to be affected by traumatising experiences, in 
the case of Iran it has been followed by an overwhelmingly violent war and isolating 
sanctions.  What can help us find a way through this convoluted situation is a consideration 
of psycho-discursive structure within an Iranian context. This issue can be discussed from 
two main perspectives which play a determining role in the way the current practice of capital 
punishment is justified. Accordingly, in the following section we will discuss the cultural and 
religious structure of Iranian society. 
Psycho-discursive structure: cultural versus religious factors 
According to Lesser (1993), capital punishment contains many different and interrelated 
aspects, such as “legal, political, ethical, aesthetic, [and] emotional” (p. 25) considerations. 
The important point regarding the simultaneous existence of these factors within a single 
sphere is that this very intricate interconnectedness of seemingly disparate aspects makes the 
realm of law-making a controversial one (Garland, 1991, 2002, p. 464). However, what is 
more or less obvious is that the legal codes to which a governing state cleaves can, in some 
way, be indicative of that society’s cultural contours. According to Durkheim (1984 [1893]) 
and Mead (1918), penal practices play defining roles in setting cultural boundaries, and also 
create solidarity via lines of demarcation between self and other. For Durkheim, the morals to 
which a society cleaves are represented by the legal codes adopted by that society. But one 
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important question that might be raised here concerns how punishment turns out to become 
such a powerful means through which the cultural, social, political and moral realities of a 
society can be both prescribed and explained. As far as the question of capital punishment in 
Iran is concerned, this issue can be examined, at least, from two perspectives: the 
performative culture of capital punishment and the religious thought associated with the 
state’s system of punishment.   
     According to Sarat (2001), what gives state punishment an undeniably authoritarian force 
is the way it assumes the public’s presence and even consents to its enactment. Sarat believes 
that all members of a society, whether in the guise of “a juridical fiction” or “as an 
authorizing audience unseeing and unseen”, are present in state punishment (p. 205). 
However, as he persuasively argues, punitive states are not able to recruit people as virtual or 
physical witnesses of an execution scene unless they apply particular theatrical techniques. 
The application of particular performative techniques finds significance when one notices the 
difference between public and non-public executions. According to Wood (2009), there is a 
considerable difference between an execution performed in a state prison and one performed 
in public. In effect, what differentiates these two forms is the question of power. Wood 
contends that when people are physically present at an execution scene, they are given 
excessive power over the event, while, when an execution is carried out behind the locked 
gates of a prison, it is the state which takes control of everything. Therefore, it might seem 
that, in an Iranian context, where the condemned person is executed in public, those attending 
the event are given a special role, hence the participatory and legitimising role of the viewer. 
But such a deduction is misleading when we consider the performativity of public execution. 
As Sarat et al. (2015) argue, the theatricality of such an event blurs the boundaries between 
“watching for pleasure or enjoyment” (spectatorship) and “witnessing, namely authorizing 
that which one sees” (p. 202). The dynamism which is produced and intensified as a result of 
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the theatricalisation of execution has a strong political consequence: it “combines the 
Lacanian constructive responsibility inherent in the viewing experience with the political 
responsibility that all democratic citizens retain” (p. 205).  Overall, the theatrical aspect of 
public execution plays a determining role in politicising a society’s citizens by making them 
responsible for what the state is supposed to be responsible for.   
     In the above argument there is a point that might give rise to a misunderstanding. On the 
one hand, we are implying that witnesses should be exonerated of any complicity with what 
they observe, and on the other hand, this idea might be conveyed that witnesses in some ways 
authorise state violence. In fact, this is a key moment in which what was presented above 
under the titles of ‘self-harm’ and ‘post-traumatic society’ can help us clarify this seemingly 
contradictory argument. Above we mentioned that a post-traumatic society, due to 
experiencing conflicting state to which the state cleaves to realise its ideology, undergoes 
self-harm. In fact, it can be argued that the governing state uses this opportunity; that is the 
conflicting state as experienced by the post-traumatic society, and by setting public execution 
prepares a terrain for the afflicted society to find a way for alleviating their pain. In other 
words, while this is true that witnesses attend the event by their own will, hence authorising 
and legitimising the state’s act, in reality they are merely reacting to their deep-seated mental 
state. Here willingness is not matter of intentional and deliberate decision but it is concerned 
with the fact that the afflicted society has no other options to cathect its pain. And for this 
cathexis to happen what is more suitable than the event that the state prepares? It is in such a 
situation that the theatricality of public execution finds significance.     
     According to Sarat (2001), the application of specific cultural representations can be used 
as a means through which a state seeks to justify the moral force behind its act and also 
legitimise it (p. 15). Such a representation follows a specific semiotic apparatus embedded 
“in discourses and symbolic practices in specific times and places” (p. 1). In this regard, as 
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Garland (1990) argues, culture and capital punishment affect each other in two ways: “culture 
gives punishment meaning and legitimacy and shapes its practice through cultural 
‘sensibilities and mentalities’. On the other hand, punishment itself defines cultural and 
sociopolitical identities and provides vivid symbols in cultural battles” (Garland, quoted in 
Boulanger and Sarat, 2005, p. 2). According to this discussion, the importance of the 
application of particular representational tools in the process of state-sponsored punishment 
can be noted. But how does the procedural aspect of capital punishment achieve such a 
determinative force? This issue finds particular relevance in the context of Iran, in which the 
visibility of capital punishment is an important part of its process.  
Theatricality as a political instrument: depersonalising the offender 
According to Valier (2005), penal practices in society include particular “textual, rhetorical 
and pictorial practices” which together form a particular punitive culture (p. 3). The 
“practices” to which Valier refers are consistent with the point Lesser (1993) makes when she 
writes about “the theoretical overlap between theatre’s way of working on its audience and 
the fascinations of violent spectacle” (p. 7). As she puts it, “all these connections remind us 
that there is a profound and historical link between murder and theatre” (p. 7). In fact, it can 
be argued that, by giving a theatrical dimension to punishment, particularly when it is 
practised in public, the state (un)intentionally dramatises the act. In this way, the more the 
state ritualises an act of punishment, the more audiences conceive of it as a dramatic and 
theatrical experience. In such a situation, the witnesses of an execution scene tend to drain the 
actors involved in the act of their real characters (i.e. a real offender and an executioner), and 
instead see them in their theatrical roles. As such, the witnesses can identify with the actors 
without necessarily getting over-involved in the act itself. In other words, the witnesses, to be 
able to create a theatrical atmosphere, impersonate the actors involved in the real act of 
punishment, while at the same time undergoing an alienation – they must be alienated in 
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order to be able to put themselves in the offender or executioner’s shoes. With regards to this 
point, Lesser (1993) writes, “once we begin to view him as the victim of depersonalisation, 
the condemned murderer instantly becomes more appealing. It is easier to identify with a 
victimised ‘it’…with his pathetic grotesques…than with an obnoxious and reprehensible 
‘him’” (p. 64).  
     Viewed from this perspective, one can argue that the performative/semiotic contour of 
capital punishment, which makes it appear like a theatrical act, sets a solid ground for the 
realisation and functioning of the ideological apparatus. As mentioned at the beginning of this 
paper, “identification” and “fantasy” are two major elements through which an ideology is 
developed. Taking into account the theatricalisation of public execution, as practiced in Iran, 
now we can argue that the impersonating mechanism as triggered by the theatre-like act of 
public execution sets a ground both for the functioning of fantasy and also identification with 
different actors involved in the act. Put another way, through impersonating the actors 
involved in the public execution, the state makes witnesses identify with people involved in 
the act in the way that they (i.e. witnesses) prefer. And the formation of this identificatory 
process for witnesses is not possible if they do not activate their imaginations, hence the 
complementary role of fantasy.   
     The above discussion also links us to what we referred to above as the blurring the 
boundary between subject and object of public execution. The impersonating mechanism as 
being activated through the theatricalisation of capital punishment disturbs the neat dividing 
line between the witnesses (as the subject) and the offender (as the object).  By activating the 
identificatory relation, the witnesses are no longer located in the position of the one who 
merely watch the scene and leave the place. Upon watching the execution scene, they can 
fantasmatically place themselves in the offender’s shoes. In a sense, it can be argued that the 
major function of public capital punishment is to set a ground for triggering fantasy, and 
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hence identification, in the witnesses. And the consequence of the latter can be seen in the 
way the witnesses of public execution identify with the offender, hence the objectification of 
the witnesses.          
Religious factors and the question of subjection 
The axiomatic fact that the ideology of the state in Iran and its constitution as drafted after the 
1979 revolution is indivisible from its Shia reading of Islam may not need further elaboration. 
Accordingly, it is also obvious that, under such a system of government, the system of 
jurisdiction is closely connected with Sharia, the system of Islamic law. Maftei (2010) has 
meticulously examined the Islamic interpretation behind the penalties enacted by the Iranian 
judiciary, hence verifying the involvement of the latter with Islamic law. Accordingly, a more 
important question to be examined here is how the state’s insistence upon the visibility of 
capital punishment is in some way associated with the religious orientation of the state. In the 
following section this issue is examined more closely.    
     For Foucault, the question of death, as the tangible consequence of capital punishment, 
has much to do with religion and the way it is interpreted by the governing state. For Foucault 
(1995), public execution is a political strategy in the hands of the state through which a 
particular ideology is enacted (p. 47). He masterfully depicts how capital punishment, 
particularly when it is performed in public, marries the terrestrial and the divine, the 
corporeal and the transcendent, in a way that takes on a particular political function that may 
not be attained otherwise. In fact, it is through such a haunting picture of death under the 
hand of the seemingly religious state that one can find a tangible link between punitive state 
culture and the way by which obedience is institutionalised in the subject, forming thereby a 
particular kind of subjectivity. The subject in such a society takes the state-sponsored 
punishment as the preceding complement to the divine trail. In this way, the gallows is the 
ladder which connects the just terrestrial judgment to the pre-ordained and irrefutable divine 
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sentence. What exactly connects these two realms is the system of reward and punishment as 
adopted by a theocratic state. As discussed above, the combination of the performative 
mechanism and the religious background of the judiciary in Iran can lead to a particular form 
of subjection. In the following section, the question of subjection will be examined more 
closely. 
Subjection  
From a Foucauldian perspective, what has been discussed in the previous section can be 
readily read as the process of subjection. Subjection, according to Judith Butler (1997), 
“signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming 
a subject” (p. 2). According to Butler, the subject’s submission to power is essential to its 
existence, whether one looks at this process according to an Althusserian theorisation of 
subjection in which the subject is “interpellated” through “ideological state apparatus” or 
through a Foucauldian approach in which the subject is submitted to hegemonic discursive 
structures as designed and consolidated through institutions. Foucault (1995) asserts that “[a] 
real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation” (p. 202). For this fictitious 
relation to form, particular processes are entailed, which Foucault refers to as “techniques” 
(p. 171) and “tactics” (p. 272) of subjection. These processes, which are performed through a 
“mechanism of objectification” (p. 224), put the subject at an objectified level (p. 184). For 
Foucault, the process of subjection relies heavily on the materiality of the human body. 
According to him, “[w]hat the apparatuses and institutions operate are, in a sense, a micro-
physics of power, whose field of validity is situated in a sense between these great 
functionings and the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces” (p. 26). These 
Foucauldian arguments provide a rich conceptual resource by means of which it would be 
possible to demonstrate how public execution in the Iranian context can lead to a particular 
form of subjection. Accordingly, the religious discursive structure rooted in Islamic law 
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provides a fabricated relation whose dynamism is supported by performative mechanisms of 
public capital punishment. As such, both the presence of the condemned man in public and 
the witnesses can function as the “micro-physics of power”. Consequently, this entire 
combination helps the process of “objectification” to go on efficiently. 
     While, as demonstrated above, a Foucauldian approach to the paradoxical formation of the 
subject is, in many ways, persuasive, in it, as Butler (1997) argues, “not only does the entire 
domain of the psyche remain largely unmarked…but power in this double valence of 
subordinating and producing remains unexplored” (p. 2). Accordingly, Butler suggests that a 
plausible solution to this problem “requires thinking the theory of power together with a 
theory of psyche” (p. 3).  This synthesis allows us to see how, in the process of subjection, 
“power that at first appears as external, pressed upon the subject, pressing the subject into 
subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject’s self-identity” (p. 3). To 
address this problem, we will complement the above discussion with a psychoanalytic 
approach which is highly affected by a Lacanian reading of subjectivity. 
The Other’s desire and ideological captivation 
Our discussion in the previous sections can be summarised as follows: behind the state’s 
emphasis upon the visibility of capital punishment, there is a kind of systematic violence 
aiming at performing as a controlling ideological apparatus. In this scenario, the body of a 
condemned man and the witnesses undergo an objectification and the semiotic manoeuvring 
of techniques and tactics of executing the condemned man support the process of subjection. 
This, in fact, can be considered as a description of how power structures work within a 
theocratic society such as Iran. But, as mentioned earlier, such an approach leaves the 
question of psyche unexplored.  
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     To complement the above discussion with a theory of psyche, we refer to the Lacanian 
conceptualisation of the socio-symbolic order (the Other). In Lacan, as Fink (1995) points 
out, the subject, as that which locates the unconscious, is defined “as a position adopted with 
respect to the Other as language or law: in other words, the subject is a relationship to the 
symbolic order” (pp. xi-xii). In fact, as Fink observes, by creating “reality as that which is 
named by language and can thus be thought and talked about…the ‘social construction of 
reality’” is enacted (p. 25). There are, at least, two important consequences that are the result 
of the subject’s entrance into the symbolic order. Firstly, such an entry makes “thinking” 
possible as a result of providing the subject with the language as the locus of the unconscious; 
secondly, it teaches the subject how to desire. In other words, the subject is not merely a 
position in relation to the Other, but what makes this relation a determining one is the 
desiring that permeates the subject as a result of being subjected to the realm of the Other. 
However, as Fink remarks, there is always an “anomaly” in the seemingly all-encompassing 
symbolic order which is unaccountable, unexplainable: an aporia” (p. 30). This inevitable and 
ontologically necessary lack within the symbolic realm causes anxiety in the subject, as it 
leads to an “enigma”. In Ruti’s (2012) words, while the subject’s socialisation “into symbolic 
law” relies on his/her being subjected to “the discourse of the Other…underneath the explicit 
meaning of the Other’s discourse, the subject is being addressed by the Other’s enigmatic 
desire” (p. 70). Ruti believes that this traumatising force is an ineluctably ontological and 
universal feature of the subject which can inflict itself upon each subject in a variety of ways. 
The important point to take into account is that this incapability of the subject to decipher 
“the meaning of the Other’s desire does not even necessarily result from some cognitive 
failing on either side of the divide but rather from the inherent ambivalence of that desire 
itself” (p. 73).  
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     To make explicit the link between lack and desire, it is necessary to elaborate further on 
the status of lack in the subject and the way through which it leads to the emergence of desire 
in him/her. Lack in the Other, as Stavrakakis’s (1999) remarks, is “first of all, a lack of 
jouissance, the lack of a pre-symbolic, real enjoyment which is always posited as something 
lost, as a lost fullness, the part of ourselves that is sacrificed/castrated when we enter the 
symbolic system of language and social relations”  (p. 40-41). In fact, when this pre-symbolic 
enjoyment, i.e. jouissance, which is a result of the infant’s full access to “the primordial 
Thing, the mother” is prohibited by the Name-of-the-Father, the infant has no other options 
but to resort to the realm of the Other, that is the realm of language, to retrieve this loss (p. 
41).  But this time the subject once more is not able to retrieve the lost Thing as the Other is 
also inflicted by a lack, or in Fink’s (1995) words, by an “anomaly” (p. 30). In other words, 
while the prohibition of jouissance causes the emergence of desire in the subject, the desiring 
subject encounters a confounding state as the symbolic order, which is where the subject 
expects to find the lost object, does not have the capacity to fulfil the latter. In Ruti’s (2012) 
words, the Other’s lack “constitutes a constant source of mystification for the subject who 
seeks answers to its existential predicament. The Other’s inconsistency, in short, forces the 
subject into the frustrating and largely defensive posture of Why are you telling me this? 
What do you want from me?”  (p. 70, emphasis in original). 
     As implied in the above quotation, this lack in the Other is home to the Lacanian real. In 
fact, the real is the realm of unrepresentability, the place which no signifier can fill. 
Jouissance arises out of the very lack of the Other. As Fink (1995) remarks,  it is “a pleasure 
that is excessive, leading to a sense of being overwhelmed or disgusted, yet simultaneously 
providing a source of fascination” (p. xii). However, the important point is that the subject’s 
“traumatic encounter with the Other’s desire” allows the subject to experience jouissance. As 
such, Fink points out, “[t]he subject—lacking in being—is thus seen to consist in a relation 
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to, or a stance adopted with respect to, the Other's desire as fundamentally thrilling and yet 
unnerving, fascinating and yet overwhelming or revolting” (p. xii).  
     The argument discussed above can shed new light on the ideological functioning of public 
execution. For Lacan, as Ruti (2012) points out, “the Other’s enigmatic desire ensures that 
the subject’s ideological ‘captivation’ is not merely a matter of its symbolic interpellation 
into hegemonic sociality but also of the ways in which the energies of its bodily ‘real’ 
respond to opaque and potentially life-arresting demands arising from the Other” (p. 69). 
Taking into account the varied and conflicting reactions that public execution elicits, it can be 
argued that it is an embodiment of the Other’s enigmatic desire. Put another way, the fact that 
state-sponsored executions, either in public or behind the locked gates of prisons, is still a 
controversial issue confirms this argument that the nature of state-killing defies a simple 
interpretation, hence the enigmatic nature of the latter.   
     Kornbluh’s (2004) notion of “negation” can also help us see how this ambivalence, as a 
result of the Other’s desire, works in relation to the issue at stake. According to Kornbluh, the 
state’s insistence upon exhibiting the scene of capital punishment that can be considered as a 
“negation”. Negation here must not be confused with the same term in psychoanalysis. As 
Kornbluh points out, it “is not a gesture of hiding something from the narrative, but rather a 
tactic of representation that actively presents the decoy in order to render non-existent/ 
structurally impossible choice” (emphasis in original, p. 124). Kornbluh refers to capital 
punishment as an example of negation in which the state-sponsored sentence aims to 
obfuscate the immersion of the unobservable yet pervasive presence of violence in a society. 
In this way, public capital punishment acts as a decoy which makes the witnesses of the scene 
imagine that, behind this behaviour of the state, there is a safe and secure life which is bound 
up with the act of capital punishment. In this sense, people’s presence at the scene implicitly 
attests the state’s insistence upon having a safe society.  
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     The act of obfuscation as elaborated above has another critical implication in the context 
of the state’s ideology. In fact, if the hypothesis of public capital punishment as a decoy is 
accepted, then we can work through another hypothesis to which the visibility of the act can 
give rise. This hypothesis is that the state does aim at obscuring the real intention behind its 
act; however, the resultant obscurantism has no particular aim but to leave the subject 
catatonic and the interpretation of the act unfathomable and cryptic. In other words, the fact 
that a state insists upon the visibility of capital punishment does not necessarily mean that it 
knows the effect of its behaviour; the fact is that even the state itself might not have a clear 
reason for doing this. However, as Ruti (2012) notes, this very ambiguity on the side of the 
state not only does not challenge its decision to perform its sentence in public, but, 
conversely, can “fortify its domain” (p. 73). Lacan (1988), specifically in Seminar II, makes 
this clear when he says “[m]an is always in the position of never completely understanding 
the law, because no man can master the law of discourse in its entirety” (p. 128).  
     A last point that can be argued here is that, in capital punishment, the state employs those 
extreme potentials with which the symbolic order provides it. This can create a scene which 
leads to the manoeuvring of a glimpse of the Lacanian real, i.e. death as that which, at least 
apparently, disrupts the chain of signification. As such, if this juxtaposition of the haunting 
image of death and the state-sponsored theatre of the irruption of the real is not the 
manifestation of jouissance, what else can it be? In Stavrakakis’s (2007) words, this can be 
read as “the mobilisation of jouissance” which is “the necessary prerequisite for any 
sustainable identification” with the ideological cause of the state (emphasis in original, p. 
282).    
Conclusion  
We started this paper with a description of the scene of public execution and finished it with a 
remark on the ideological function of this event. What has linked these two phenomena is the 
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particular rendering of violence in the hand of the punitive state. From this perspective, we 
can argue that the core element of this paper is violence. In this way, a more or less obvious 
conclusion is that the state’s implicit or systematic violence is the guarantor of its ideological 
controlling mechanism. But the less tangible deduction can unravel the contours of state 
violence. In fact, to realise how this violence works, one must attend to the resource from 
which this violence feeds. Here we can argue that what allows the state to apply its 
systematic violence is the crime that the offender commits, which results in his/her public 
execution. In other words, if there were no crimes punishable by the death penalty, the state 
would not be able to manoeuvre its ideological apparatus. In a sense, the ideological purposes 
of the state heavily depend on the prevalence of the crimes that can cost one’s life.  Put it 
another way, the life of the state is bound up with the (theatricalised) death of a citizen. This 
citizen might be a murderer/ess who pays the price for what s/he does by being killed or can 
be an innocent witness who is not hanged but can identify with the one whose body dangles 
from the scaffold. This is what we mean by the morbid dance of ideology on the scaffold.   
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